Time Schedule:
Laurence A Bonjour
PHIL 463
Seattle Campus
Examination of current theories of the nature of the mind and mental processes.
Class description
In this course, we will examine some of the main issues in recent philosophy of mind, centering around the question of whether there is a defensible materialist account of minds and mental states. In addition to a look at the dualist alternative, we will consider the main materialist views: logical behaviorism, the mind-body identity theory, eliminativism (all three of these fairly briefly), and especially the still fairly dominant functionalist view. We will consider and attempt to evaluate the main objections to functionalism, objections having to do with (i) qualitative states, (ii) intentional states, and (iii) consciousness itself. In relation to (ii), we will also consider in some detail what an alternative, non-materialist view might look like. Some attention will also be given to externalist views of mental content and to issues concerning reduction. Mid-term and final exams, plus several short papers (or an optional term paper). TEXT: Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, John Heil.
Student learning goals
General method of instruction
Recommended preparation
Class assignments and grading
