The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the centerpiece of international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The treaty was signed in 1968, a time when the tool of multilateral nuclear arms control was relatively new and widespread nuclear proliferation was considered a likely development. Indeed, there were predictions during the Kennedy administration that by the late 1970s there would be twenty-five to thirty declared nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons integrated into their arsenals. The NPT stopped this trend and formed the foundation for further successes in international arms control. There are still only five nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China) recognized by the NPT, the same as in 1968. There are three nuclear capable states or threshold states (India, Pakistan, and Israel—with India and Pakistan, to the detriment of the world community, having conducted tests in 1998 and declaring themselves to be nuclear weapon states) that are not recognized by the NPT.

The multilateral arms control forum in Geneva where the NPT was negotiated—as well as the BWC (1971), CWC (1993), the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1972), the Environmental Modification Convention (1976), and the CTBT (1996)—originally was called the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee and was designed to bring the East and West together in a common forum. Later, as explained earlier herein, as it expanded to ultimately sixty-six nations, it was called the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (this was its composition at the time of the NPT negotiation), the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and finally simply the Committee on Disarmament (CD). It gradually lost its East-West character and became instead a smaller version of the United Nations First Committee.

During the NPT negotiations, most of the seventeen negotiating parties at the CD in Geneva (France didn’t take its seat for many years) wanted an NPT of unlimited duration, as is the case with all other arms
control agreements, but three countries (Germany, Italy, and Sweden) would not agree to a treaty of indefinite duration. They were unwilling to permanently give up the nuclear option. The Cold War was at its peak, no one knew how effective the NPT would be and whether many countries would join, and there was concern over whether the verification provisions—administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and called “safeguards”—might put countries at a commercial disadvantage. This difference of view gave rise to the compromise language of Article X.2 in the treaty, which provided that twenty-five years after the entry into force of the treaty a conference would be convened to decide by majority vote whether the treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. In other words, the NPT would be in force for twenty-five years and then the parties would decide by majority vote whether or not it should be made permanent.

This decision was delegated by Article X.2 to the conference, where it could be taken without reference to national legislatures (which would make extension a practical impossibility given the large number of states parties). Since the treaty authorized only one extension decision pursuant to this delegation to the conference, any further NPT extension after the one agreed to in 1995 could only have been done by amendment, which would of course require approval by legislatures. Further, because of the treaty’s provisions on amendment, it is virtually unamendable. The conference thus provided a one-time opportunity to give the NPT the same permanence all other international arms control treaties enjoy.

Article X.2 provided for a decision by a majority of the parties, not just those present and voting; thus the location of the 1995 conference would be an important decision. The location would determine how many would attend, and, because of this voting provision, it was important to achieve as broad an attendance as possible. The treaty also provided for periodic five-year review conferences to review the operation of the treaty. The 1995 conference was to both review the treaty’s operation and consider its extension. Soon after the 1990 NPT Review Conference, ACDA began analyzing the option of holding the 1995 conference at United Nations headquarters in New York, rather than in Geneva, where all the previous NPT review conferences had been held. New York would encourage broader participation, since many countries had a diplomatic presence there, but not in Geneva. It was decided by the states parties at the May 1993 preparatory committee meeting to hold the conference in New York. ACDA’s analytic effort grew into an ACDA White Paper on the implementation of the NPT and strategy for the 1995 conference, referred to officially as the NPT Review and Extension Conference. (It was important for the NAM that “Review” be in the title of the conference, indicating that nuclear weapon state performance would be reviewed and that the review would come before any decision on extension.) This paper made a strong case for the indefinite extension of the treaty.
without conditions, and shaped the United States’ position to actively promote this outcome. Indefinite extension was always favored within the U.S. government, but initially there was some internal consideration of a fallback position.

In 1991 ACDA began to identify opportunities for promoting indefinite extension without conditions. ACDA officials began to meet bilaterally with NPT parties to promote support for indefinite extension. In addition, U.S. representatives to several meetings of international organizations were armed with talking points in support of indefinite extension. In this fashion, first NATO, then the Group of Seven industrialized nations, and then the CSCE (now OSCE) were persuaded to endorse group statements in support of indefinite extension of the NPT without conditions as the most desirable outcome for the 1995 conference. The United States undertook these multilateral diplomatic efforts in close consultation with allies, including the two other depository states, Russia and the United Kingdom.

The other two nuclear weapon states, France and China, became NPT parties in 1991 and 1992, respectively. France was an early and consistent supporter of indefinite extension and made a significant contribution to the outcome in discussions in both the European Union and the Western Group, as well as through bilateral efforts with francophone states in Africa. China, however, remained an enigma throughout the process, publicly stating only that China wanted a “smooth” extension. At a dinner in Geneva in June 1994 French Ambassador Errera asked Chinese Ambassador Ho whether China favored indefinite NPT extension. Ho’s answer was, “Indefinite? That is a good word, but we do not have that word in the Chinese language.” It was my understanding during this process that China preferred indefinite extension, but they never said so publicly.

By 1993 a large number of supporters had been rallied behind indefinite extension, but a majority remained uncertain. NATO and OSCE comprised only about fifty of the then 160 NPT parties in 1993. In 1993 the South Pacific Forum (which included the membership of the Raratonga Treaty—the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) declared as a body for indefinite extension, thus adding ten more for a total of sixty. (Not all of the South Pacific Forum members were NPT parties in 1993. Three, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, joined the NPT before the conference in 1995, and supported indefinite extension. Two of these, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands had not yet joined the Raratonga Treaty in 1993.) However, support for indefinite extension among these sixty states was far from monolithic. The Soviet Union passed into history on December 25, 1991, and its twelve successor states spent much of 1992 trying to create foreign policies, including policies on NPT extension. Switzerland was reluctant to support indefinite extension, stating that it feared that a narrow majority might prove divisive. (I always suspected that their reluctance was not unrelated to the fact that the conference was to take place in New York, not Geneva.) This
left approximately 100 states (almost all of them members of the NAM) uncommitted in 1993. Clearly, the NAM, which constituted a majority of the parties, would play an important role. No option could prevail against coordinated NAM opposition.

Indefinite extension appeared in 1992 and 1993 to be a long shot. NAM countries had a long history of attempting to use the NPT as leverage against the nuclear weapon states to extract arms control progress. The 1980 and 1990 NPT review conferences failed because of lack of progress toward a CTBT, and the 1975 and 1985 review conferences essentially papered over the differences. It appeared unlikely that the NAM leadership—such states as Indonesia, Mexico, Egypt, and Malaysia—would be willing to give up this leverage even for the security that a permanent NPT would bring. As a result, there was substantial skepticism within the Western Group that indefinite NPT extension was possible. Many viewed indefinite extension as a bargaining position from which a compromise such as rolling twenty-five-year extensions could be obtained. Rolling periods meant, for example, that at the end of each twenty-five-year period there would be another Review and Extension Conference and a majority vote would be required to go to the next twenty-five-year period. In addition to placing the NPT at risk every twenty-five years, I always believed that this was of questionable legality—Article X.2 contained no authority for further delegations of authority without reference to national legislatures. Of course, a series of fixed periods could have been agreed to—X.2 authorized that—with automatic transition from one to the next absent a majority vote not to do this. This would have been little more than specified group withdrawal—unsettling to the NPT regime, but legal under X.2. Until near the end of the process Conference President Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala viewed successive twenty-five-year periods with automatic transition from one period to the next as the best possible outcome for the NPT, but he was not sure even this could be achieved. Indonesia, influenced by Greenpeace, was flirting with five-year rolling periods dependent on specific arms control progress at the end of each period to get to the next.

Only the United States never wavered in its pursuit of indefinite extension, although France and Australia remained generally positive throughout. However, given the number of NAM parties and the hard-line position of its leadership, it was clear that for the United States and others to prevail they would have to bypass the NAM leadership and appeal directly to the security interests of the individual NAM countries. When I took over the leadership of the U.S. effort to extend the NPT in December 1993 I made up my mind that I would give indefinite extension my best effort. Although few agreed, I believed that it was achievable if we remained optimistic, were creative, and never wavered. I also resolved to appeal to countries directly in their capitals, rather than deal with their disarmament representatives at the
When John Holum was selected as director in July of 1993, he told me that he wanted me to have the position that I wanted. I decided not to ask for deputy director, since it seemed to me likely to be complicated, and I preferred a negotiating position in any case. So I said I would like the special representative position with the rank of ambassador and to have the NPT extension assignment as a first task. It was understood at that time that ACDA would select someone to head U.S. government efforts to achieve NPT extension. Therefore, the day after he was sworn in on November 23, 1993, he signed two memos, one assigning the NPT leadership to me and the other appointing me acting deputy director. It was understood that my name would be sent to the White House for the position of special representative of the president for arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament with the rank of ambassador early in 1994 along with the other ACDA presidential appointees. Also, as part of this, I was designated the head of the U.S. delegation to the second, third, and fourth NPT prepcoms.

The first prepcom, held in New York in May of 1993, was chaired by the Netherlands, a Western Group country. The program of work for the conference was adopted, the date and location of the Review and Extension Conference (April 17–May 12, 1995, in New York) and the dates of the three additional prepcom meetings were decided, and the chairs of the second and third (but not the fourth) prepcom meetings were selected. Decisions were also taken on working languages and summary records. The NAM proposed Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka for conference president, and the Eastern Group proposed Poland for the presidency. Controversy over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including its status as a party to the NPT, led some delegations to seek its ouster from the prepcom; finally, it was decided to let the Yugoslavia nameplate remain in place so long as no one occupied the chair. This agreement held throughout the prepcom process and the conference, although there were periodic alarms. The U.K. chaired the Western Group at the first prepcom and remained in the chair throughout the NPT extension process. Russia was to a degree the leader of the Eastern Group, but it met only to discuss procedural issues. Indonesia as NAM chair was the non-aligned leader.

As I have described, in July of 1993, the United States fortunately took a major step toward the achievement of indefinite NPT extension when President Clinton announced that the United States was prepared to negotiate a CTBT and would continue the existing nuclear testing moratorium. The CTBT had been the main NPT-related objective of non-nuclear weapon states parties since the entry into force of the NPT. This decision put the United States squarely on the right side of this issue looking forward to the 1995 confer-
ence. Given the centrality of this issue, it clearly was important to make as much progress as possible toward a CTBT before the conference so as to convince NAM countries that a CTBT would in fact happen.

In October 1993 ACDA increased its efforts to promote indefinite extension. As acting director, I created a separate division dedicated to NPT extension (headed by Susan Burk) in the ACDA Nonproliferation Bureau and in December 1993, as indicated, John Holum selected me as special representative for NPT extension. I was later confirmed by the Senate as special representative and ambassador in July 1994. This made the United States the only country to have a dedicated NPT extension ambassador. I began the campaign for indefinite extension with an increased number of bilateral consultations commencing in December 1993.

The basic argument that I made to other countries was that because the Article X.2 procedure is built into the treaty, it was approved by parliaments in the course of ratifying the treaty, and thus on a one-time basis the delegates at the 1995 conference have the authority to extend the treaty. Any further extension would have to be approved by all the 160-plus parliaments—an impossibility in today’s world. Thus, the 1995 conference would be the only opportunity to make this treaty, which is the cornerstone of international peace and stability and the base on which all other arms control and non-proliferation agreements are built, permanent like all other arms control treaties. Indefinite NPT extension is the best foundation for further progress in nuclear arms control as the nuclear weapon states doing the disarming need the security of a permanent NPT. And a permanent NPT is the best basis for peaceful nuclear cooperation. For example, a nuclear power reactor requires ten years to build and thirty years to operate, and the spent fuel has to be safeguarded forever. For the appropriate economic decisions to be made there must be assurance that the IAEA safeguards which flow from the NPT will not expire.

I conducted an intense schedule of bilateral (as well as multilateral) meetings in New York, Geneva, Vienna, and many capitals throughout the NPT extension process. During 1994 and 1995 I visited more than forty capitals in North and South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. The idea behind these visits was to try to avoid discussing NPT extension with the NAM as a bloc, but rather to attempt to address this question with individual countries—to go to capitals to listen to the concerns of governments, and to the extent possible respond to them. It was important to avoid, if possible, a NAM-bloc position against indefinite extension. Many countries stressed the importance of a CTBT and some also emphasized the need for updated and legally binding negative security assurances—pledges by the nuclear weapon states not to attack non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons (most of the NAM wanted this)—and positive security assurances—pledges by the nuclear weapon states to come to the aid of non-nuclear weapon states threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons (Egypt wanted
this). Some countries, primarily in the Middle East, underscored the problem of Israel not being an NPT party. All countries urged more technical cooperation pursuant to Article IV.

However, the tone was usually different in NAM capitals than the positions taken by NAM representatives in New York and Geneva. Officials in capitals appeared to be more interested in a dialogue on the issue with the United States while representatives in New York and particularly Geneva appeared to be more influenced by NAM-bloc politics. But the most important thing was for the United States to make the effort to go to capitals and listen to individual country’s concerns. Also, by means of these visits to capitals, I developed many professional relationships with diplomats and other officials in NAM countries that proved decisively valuable at the conference. Other ACDA and State officials visited additional capitals. In addition, U.S. ambassadors and other embassy officials around the world continuously and effectively made the case for indefinite NPT extension. The NPT Extension Division at ACDA played a vital role within the U.S. government effort by coordinating the global campaign of demarches and consultations in support of indefinite extension.

John Holum made many presentations on NPT extension at various fora during the process, as did I and others. ACDA Deputy Director Ralph Earle chaired the U.S. interagency effort in the endgame and was deputy U.S. representative at the conference itself, thereby freeing me from the administrative management of the now very large U.S. delegation so that I could continue to work with the delegates. It all worked out well. Secretary of State Warren Christopher (who made the welcoming speech to the conference and who, along with Holum and Undersecretary Lynn Davis, made a presentation to the Washington ambassadorial corps shortly before the conference) and the relevant assistant secretaries of state (the regional bureaus as well as PM) supported the effort and, when possible, made the case for indefinite extension personally to their foreign counterparts. During the conference itself Assistant Secretaries Pelletreau (Middle East), Raphel (South Asia), Watson (Latin America), and Moose (Africa), and East Asia and Pacific Office Director Huddle from Assistant Secretary Lord’s bureau, came to New York to talk directly with the representatives from their regions.

In the fall of 1994 I prepared an interagency paper setting forth what I believed was needed to achieve indefinite extension. It focused on the need to get as close to completion of the CTBT negotiations as possible so as to make it appear to be a near-term certainty by the time of the conference (if the negotiations could not be completed before the conference); the need for updated positive and negative security assurances, and the strong preference among NAM states that they be legally binding; and the need to adhere as a protocol party to the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty soon, and to be prepared to similarly adhere to the protocols of the emerging African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty when it was completed. It also discussed
the threat posed to the process by the conflict between Egypt and Israel over the Israeli nuclear program, and the conflict between the Egyptian insistence that Israel take a “concrete step” before the conference in the direction of eventual NPT membership and the inability of Israel to take such a step at that time. The ACDA paper led to the development of an interagency paper on a game plan for achieving indefinite extension.

These papers caused increasing U.S. government-wide attention to the effort to achieve the goal of indefinite NPT extension. This process culminated in a deputies meeting held during the fourth prepcom (in late January 1995) at which an all-out U.S. government effort to achieve indefinite NPT extension was agreed. It should be noted that the deputies meeting was scheduled only after Barbara Crossette’s major piece appeared in the New York Times in January 1995, during the fourth prepcom, describing how the U.S. government was unprepared for the soon-to-begin NPT Review and Extension Conference. Up to this time there was only marginal White House interest, and with Susan’s help I wrote my own instructions.

The increased effort began in late January, after the deputies meeting, and continued through the end of the conference. By February of 1995, the entire U.S. government was visibly committed at the highest levels to achieving indefinite extension as a first priority. The Department of Defense and the National Security Council staff joined in with vigor. At my urging Hazel O’Leary made a highly influential personal appearance at the conference itself at a meeting of approximately 100 representatives sponsored by the Campaign for the Non-Proliferation Treaty—an alliance of prominent NGOs headed by Joseph Cirincione, a most effective supporter throughout the process. One of the NAM ambassadors told me, after her presentation, that it was the most persuasive speech that he had ever heard. I had negotiated with DOE and Joe for some time for Hazel to come and make this speech, particularly after she had made a useful speech on the margins of the fourth prepcom that had been praised by many delegates. And finally, the president and the vice president made clear their personal commitment: President Clinton mentioned it in his January 1995 State of the Union address, and Vice President Gore headed the U.S. delegation and made the all-important U.S. national statement at the opening of the conference.

All along, the position of the United States was for indefinite NPT extension without conditions. “Without conditions” meant simply that the extension of the treaty could not be voided and that the NPT would not expire if, for example, in the future certain disarmament goals were not met. In a July speech at Livermore, California, John Holum argued that one should not “gamble with something that you cannot afford to lose.” I reiterated this in many of my speeches. Japan and some other parties initially had difficulty with the “without conditions” part of the formula because of their interest in ensuring that progress toward disarmament continued. However, this phrase was never meant to exclude a commitment to continued efforts
to meet disarmament obligations under the NPT. “Unconditionality” was simply intended to exclude legal threats to the continued life of the treaty, which would have in effect negated an indefinite extension decision, threatening a “worst of both worlds” outcome if a CTBT, for example, were not achieved. Japan and other states came to accept this and to support indefinite extension without conditions.

Most NGOs in the United States, while supporting indefinite extension, thought it impossible to achieve because of NAM opposition. However, they were stalwart in their support, through the campaign organization, primarily with the idea that by remaining firm the United States could get the longest possible extension at the conference, which they hoped would be some variation of twenty-five-year periods succeeding one another automatically, a series of fixed periods. They often urged the U.S. government to keep open the door for fallback positions, but I kept the door firmly closed. As mentioned above, many of the Western Group were of the same view, and Russia was as well. They were willing to fight hard for indefinite extension, but believed a fallback was inevitable in the end. I found myself often giving pep talks to the Western Group in 1994 and early 1995 to the effect that indefinite extension could and would be achieved. In this I was consistently supported only by France and Australia.

Among the many important members of the NAM in the NPT extension process, I identified five as particularly influential: Indonesia (as chair of the NAM), Egypt and Mexico (long-time leaders in non-proliferation and disarmament), South Africa (enjoying both President Mandela’s global leadership role and being the only country to have destroyed its nuclear weapons and joined the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state party), and Colombia (the next NAM Chair). Special attention was paid to these countries in addition to the efforts undertaken to appeal to the NAM membership as a whole. Most NAM members, above all, wanted to see a CTBT concluded. The United States, thus, put as much pressure on the CTBT negotiating process as it could and strongly defended the testing moratorium. For his part, President Clinton called for a CTBT “at the earliest possible date.” The United States also well understood during the extension process the basic bargain of the NPT—no additional states would acquire nuclear weapons and those that had them would engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at their reduction and ultimate abolition. The United States worked hard to bring START I (succeeding on December 5, 1994) and START II into force, and I stated the U.S. commitment to the basic bargain of the NPT on a number of occasions.

It was also important for the United States to reiterate its continued commitment to the NPT-mandated goal of the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. Vice President Gore included this in his national speech to the 1995 conference. It was also included in the communiqué from the meeting in early 1994 between President Clinton and Prime Minister Rao of India, in which the two leaders stressed their commitment to the ultimate abolition of all
weapons of mass destruction. I made much use of this document in speeches and bilateral consultations.

Virtually all NAM countries wanted to see more peaceful cooperation in the nuclear energy field under Article IV of the treaty and I did my best to listen closely and do what I could to lay the basis for increased cooperation. Australia and Japan were also quite active in bilateral NPT diplomacy supporting indefinite extension, and later on France, Russia, Germany and a number of others participated in a significant way.

SOUTH AFRICA

In August of 1994 Susan Burk and I, in the course of visiting several African countries to advocate indefinite extension, stopped in South Africa for two days of meetings. South African government officials emphasized South Africa’s commitment to the NPT regime and they explained their new domestic legislation that buttressed the NPT regime. While dedicated to the NPT regime, in August of 1994 South Africa had not yet made a decision on NPT extension. They wanted a long extension, but also did not want a divisive result. I argued that indefinite extension would be the result most likely to establish the basis for further arms control progress and increased peaceful nuclear cooperation. Also, a permanent NPT would be a distinct security benefit to South Africa.

Part of the visit included a tour of its low enriched uranium (LEU) enrichment plant, the shut down highly enriched uranium (HEU) plant at Pelindaba, and the nuclear weapon fabrication facility at Wallendaba. Extensive briefings accompanied the tours. We were informed by our South African hosts that we were the first Americans to see the HEU plant and the nuclear weapon fabrication facility, except for two Americans on the IAEA inspection team. The South Africans explained that the entire nuclear weapon program produced six nuclear weapons (with a yield of approximately twenty kilotons each), involved a total of only 150 people, was very low budget, involved relatively simple “gun barrel” technology that did not need to be tested, and was completely hidden from view. They took us into the room at ARMSCOR where the weapons were assembled. They said, “Look around you, nothing has changed.” There was nothing there that you would not find in a high school machine shop. They showed us the cases they used to move the weapons around, so we had an idea of their size: they would have easily fit in the back of a panel truck. They said that they were showing all this to us to make the point that a large infrastructure, such as the one Iraq had developed prior to the Gulf War, is not necessary to acquire nuclear weapons. Many countries, indeed, even sub-state organizations, could do what South Africa had done if they could acquire the fissile material.
Vice President Gore had several communications with First Deputy President Mbeki and I persuaded General Colin Powell to write to President Mandela. Both urged South Africa to think positively about supporting indefinite extension of the NPT. When I called General Powell to ask him to write the letter, saying it could be important to NPT extension, I told him that the South African desk had told me that he was one of two Americans to whom President Mandela might listen, and that was why I was calling. He replied, “who is the other one?” “Henry Kissinger,” I said. “I’ve made the big time at last,” he said.

I wrote the letter in draft while riding on a train to New York with Christine one weekend. I showed it to her and asked her if she thought it would work. She said she thought that it would be OK with a few editorial changes. I made the changes she suggested and then sent it to Powell, who made only a few changes himself. I had cleared the idea, but not the text, with Tony Lake and Strobe Talbott. NSC subsequently wanted to clear the text interagency, but no one would challenge a text that was now in the former chairman’s language.

Early in 1995 South Africa began to speak of an NPT that was extended “in perpetuity.” At the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in March 1995 (South Africa being a new member), South Africa agreed to a communiqué that supported “perpetual” (changed at South Africa’s request from “indefinite”) extension of the NPT. South Africa had decided that it wanted to be a bridge between the Western and Eastern Groups and the NAM with respect to NPT extension. Its preference was for a permanent NPT, but whether the least divisive outcome was that or a rolling twenty-five-year extension had not yet been decided in Pretoria. Also in March, the South African government formally responded to the same effect in Pretoria in response to a U.S. demarche.

In early April 1995, the South African government told the U.S. embassy in Pretoria that it would support indefinite extension, but in a way that would bring the two sides together. The United States subsequently learned that this decision had been made personally by First Deputy President Mbeki after a long internal debate about whether South Africa’s national interest lay in supporting indefinite extension or the NAM position for something less, with members of the ruling African National Congress on both sides of the debate. This decision was confirmed in Washington in early April in a discussion among the South African ambassador to the United States, ACDA Director Holum, and myself. The ambassador said that South Africa wanted a permanent NPT, but also wanted the NAM parties to be content with the outcome. After our NPT discussion in John’s office, the ambassador reminisced a bit about President Mandela. He was a long-time colleague of the president’s. He said that we might have noticed that the president never makes religious references in his speeches, even though he is a profoundly religious man. In South Africa, during the apartheid period, the Bible was used to jus-
tify the system, said the ambassador. So the president does not refer to the Bible in his speeches, he simply tries to ascertain what it is that Jesus would have him do—and does it. Impressive words, I thought.

It was apparent by this time that virtually all of southern Africa, as well as other states in Africa, would follow South Africa’s lead. In August 1994 I had visited Namibia shortly before my stop in South Africa. At that time Namibia was strongly supportive of indefinite extension. However, by March 1995 Namibia had moved in line with the other members of the Southern African Development Commission in following South Africa’s lead on the NPT. Foreign Minister Nzo—speaking on the third day of the conference, the same day as Vice President Gore—stated that South Africa would support indefinite NPT extension, but in the context of a statement of non-proliferation principles and objectives that would be the “yardstick by which all states parties can measure their non-proliferation and disarmament achievements and a strengthened review process.”

Initially, the government in Pretoria was attacked in the local press for having sold out African interests and the NAM in response to U.S. pressure. By the end of the conference, however, the criticism had turned to widespread praise of the government as South Africa emerged as the key broker of the decision in New York.

EGYPT AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Egypt presented a special problem. During my April 1994 visit to Cairo with Susan Burk, Foreign Minister Moussa made it clear in no uncertain terms that Egypt, although devoted to the NPT, would not support indefinite extension or even a long extension unless, prior to the conference, Israel took a “concrete step” in the direction of eventual NPT membership. Moussa expressed his views in this meeting in the strongest of terms. Our voices were rather loud during this first meeting. Before we went in to see Moussa, Nabil Fahmy, his special assistant and a most influential official (he is the son of a former foreign minister and, beginning in 1999, Egyptian ambassador to the United States), spoke with Susan and me. He said, “Why Susan, by urging indefinite extension you are suggesting Catholic marriage (to a Muslim) for the NPT.” “And what is wrong with Catholic marriage,” bristled Susan, a devout Roman Catholic.

Afterwards, Nabil assured me that despite the harsh rhetoric, the meeting had been a success. I wasn’t so sure. In my various discussions in Cairo on this trip, Egyptian officials noted that a large number of nuclear weapons with the capability of destroying all Arab nations in a few minutes existed right next door to Egypt. What guarantee did they have that some day—Egypt had no problem with the present Israeli government—some crazy extremist might not come to power in Israel? Like the man who had recently...
shot to death twenty-nine Palestinians at prayer in a mosque? No state could assure that such a thing could not happen.

The discussion with Egypt continued in Washington, New York, and again in Cairo. Foreign Minster Moussa’s continual argument was that Egypt could not live forever with a huge, unconstrained nuclear arsenal on its border. What assurance could Egypt have that the Israeli government would always be in stable hands? I would reply that a short extension could destroy the NPT and did Egypt really want to risk the possibility of many states in the region and elsewhere acquiring nuclear arms? Egyptian officials would respond that perhaps a short extension would terminate the NPT, but that even so they did not think widespread proliferation would threaten Egypt more than it was threatened then. The Egyptians were never entirely clear as to what the desired “concrete step” by Israel would be, but mentioned things like agreement to negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security Forum (ACRS), and something with respect to the nuclear reactor at Dimona in Israel. I made a second trip to Cairo to speak with Foreign Minister Moussa in December 1994, and went on to make public and private presentations in Israel and Jordan. During the second meeting, Moussa agreed to keep an open mind on NPT extension, but the Egyptian position never changed appreciably in spite of a number of direct discussions with the Israelis and meetings between President Mubarak, President Clinton, Foreign Minister Moussa, and Secretary of State Christopher. U.S. Ambassador Ned Walker believed by the end of 1994 that the Egyptians had made the NPT issue too public and thus could not move from their position. However, Egypt was never able to persuade the Arab League to back their position.

In my first visit to Egypt I did visit Arab League headquarters and had a useful, but quite general, discussion with the deputy secretary general, a Syrian. Jordan was skeptical of the Egyptian position. In Amman, Abdullah Toucan, the key figure in the Jordanian government for these subjects—as well as other senior officials—told me that they thought the Egyptian position was misguided, that Israel would eventually join the NPT, not as a result of confrontation but only after a long evolutionary period in which Israel’s security could be assured. My first meeting in Jordan was a tumultuous public presentation in which the response to my plea for support from Jordan for indefinite extension drew strong denunciations of the Israeli nuclear program. Thus, I anticipated that my private, official meetings with the Jordanians would be difficult as well, perhaps like the meetings with Moussa. At the initial meeting one of the first things that one of the senior Jordanians said was how much he enjoyed his summer home on Cape Cod. I then thought that perhaps everything would be alright.

An Arab League meeting in March of 1995 held in part to address the subject came to no decision on NPT extension. In 1994, after visiting Cairo, Susan and I went to Riyadh and had useful discussions with Saudi officials,
but received no commitment at that time. We also met with representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council (the organization of Persian Gulf states). Their chairman said that the Israeli nuclear program did create political problems, but he did not speak in the strident tones of Foreign Minister Moussa. He said it would help if occasionally the United States would denounce the Israeli program “even if you don’t mean it.”

Also, in the spring of 1994 on our way to Cairo, Susan and I visited Morocco to solicit support from its government for indefinite extension. We stopped in Paris on the way and met with two of the leaders of the indefinite extension effort in Paris, Thérèse Delpeche of the Atomic Energy Ministry, an influential official and close advisor of Ambassador Gerard Ererra, French CD Ambassador and the leader of their NPT effort, as well as Daniel Parfait, a key official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We also met with U.S. DCM Avis Bohlen at the embassy. Avis, one of the major figures in the U.S. Foreign Service in the arms control field, gave us good insights into French NPT policy. She was always someone you could rely on.

In Morocco, Susan and I were successful in obtaining a commitment from the government to support indefinite extension, although they waffled a bit later when all that trouble concerning Egypt surfaced. While Susan was laboriously typing up our reporting cable, I somewhat callously played hooky in the form of a round of golf on the Royal Salaam Golf Course—a great course. Late that night, after a good Moroccan dinner, we were driven to Casablanca and took the red-eye to Cairo.

My discussions in Israel in December 1994 were comprehensive. Israeli officials regarded the NPT as important. They said they would be willing to again consider taking some kind of step to address Egyptian concerns, but even though many meetings between the foreign ministers of the two countries were held during the run up to the conference, Israel never concluded that it was in a position to do anything. Before I went to Israel, State Department officials indicated that I would be given a very difficult time by the Israelis, perhaps the most difficult that I had ever experienced. Thus, my visit had to be carefully prepared. Nothing could have been further from the truth. I gave a speech on the importance of the NPT at the Jaffe Center at Tel Aviv University and the questions were all polite and constructive. Both Defense and Foreign Ministry officials understood the importance of the NPT. Several officials said that when Israel could be assured that Iran and Iraq were not threats to acquire nuclear weapons they would consider the NPT, but not before. In any case, they did not do anything specific to respond to Egypt.

Many discussions were held by the United States and other NPT parties with both Egypt and Israel. A considerable number of the discussions involving the United States were conducted directly by Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Pelletreau. Foreign Minister Moussa made several trips to Washington and President Mubarak came to Washington just before the
conference. Secretary Christopher discussed the NPT in Cairo several times. Nabil Fahmy also sought several additional meetings with me in Geneva, New York, and Washington to press the Egyptian case. This issue was never fully resolved, although an attempt was made to be responsive to Egypt and some of the Arabs by negotiating a resolution on the Middle East at the conference. It was only partially successful. Egypt and its Arab allies did sit still for indefinite extension, but reluctantly.

Interestingly, in early March 1995, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on the NPT Review and Extension Conference—the only Congressional hearing on the issue. I testified, backed up by Susan, along with Jim Schlesinger (who held up for me to see a copy of Arms Control Today, which had reprinted my February 18, 1995, speech at an ACA luncheon, providing a comprehensive defense of the U.S. position) and Ken Adelman. Chairman William Roth presided and five other senators, including Glenn and McCain, attended. At one point Senator McCain asked me how Mexico and Egypt could justify opposing the United States on indefinite NPT extension, which is so important to the United States, given all the financial and other support that they get from us. I replied that I could not explain the Mexican position, but it had to be recognized that Egypt was located in a dangerous and difficult neighborhood. In March, when Moussa was in Washington preparing for Mubarak’s visit, Nabil Fahmy came to see me. He said that the foreign minister had read my testimony and had sent Fahmy to express his personal gratitude.

At the conference, Egypt and other Arab states, in the absence of action by Israel, wanted a conference statement or resolution on the subject. Moussa was in New York and I had the opportunity, arranged by Bob Pelletreau, to speak with him early in the conference and urge Egyptian support for indefinite extension. Nevertheless, the night before indefinite extension was approved two days before the end of the conference, the Middle East situation was completely unresolved. Thus, around 4:00 p.m. a marathon session began with Dhanapala in the chair, the Egyptians and the Syrians primarily representing the Arabs (the Saudis, who had been out front, had faded from view somewhat), negotiating with the United States, represented by Ambassador Albright, Bob Einhorn, and me. This was the last piece of the four-part conference decision to be made the next day: the Indefinite Extension Resolution, the Statement of Principles and Objectives, the Statement on Enhanced Review, and the Middle East Resolution. At issue was an appeal in the Middle East Resolution that Israel join the NPT along with the three other states in the Middle East region that had not joined (Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Djibouti). Israel objected to being mentioned by name and the Israeli mission was called every half-hour from our negotiating room by Bob Einhorn. After several hours of stalemate, representatives of the three states appeared and said that they did not want to be explicitly mentioned either. There was no solution other than a general exhortation for all non-
parties in the Middle East to join. Egypt and Syria were so disgusted they refused to co-sponsor the text. Dhanapala firmly declined also and turned to me to ask if the depositaries would agree to co-sponsor—even though we did not yet have a written text. I replied in the affirmative for the United States, but said I would have to check with the United Kingdom and Russia. I told Dhanapala that I would let him know early the next morning.

I knew where the United Kingdom and Russian ambassadors were; they were at a dinner where I was supposed to be as well. So I walked over to the wall telephone and called the restaurant. Michael Weston, the U.K. ambassador, came to the telephone first and promptly agreed. Sergei Kislyak, the Russian ambassador said that he would have to check with Moscow. I then proceeded to join them along with the others from what we privately called “the Board of Directors” (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Germany). This group of five states had agreed to meet together daily during the conference to coordinate efforts to achieve our common objective. Our meetings were essentially kept quiet and they proved to be most useful. The next morning at 7:30 a.m. Sergei called me in my hotel room and said that Moscow had informed him that he could co-sponsor. There was one condition, however. “What is that,” I asked. “Moscow says I have to read it first,” Sergei replied.

I then called Dhanapala and told him that the depositaries would co-sponsor (presumably Sergei would get his chance to read the text—which had only been printed that morning). This was duly done after the first three documents (the Indefinite Extension Resolution, the Statement of Principles, and the Enhanced Review) were approved. It did sound a bit odd: the Resolution on the Middle East was offered by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia after the first three were offered by the conference president. The resolution was held up on the floor for about two hours by the Iranian representative because of a positive reference to the peace process. A huge huddle developed around the Iranian representative, but this too was resolved and the last piece of the indefinite extension package was gavelled through about noon.

INDONESIA

Indonesia, as NAM chairman, regarded itself as the leader of the opposition to indefinite extension and remained so until near the end of the process. Many discussions were held with UN Permanent Representative Ambassador Wisnumurti in New York to no avail. Indeed, as late as the end of the week before the conference, Ambassador Wisnumurti, along with Ambassador Ibrahim from Jakarta, the head of the Indonesian NPT delegation until Foreign Minister Alatas arrived during the last week, invited me to their mission to discuss alternatives to indefinite extension. When I said that the United
States would not concede on indefinite extension, but would be prepared to
discuss related issues, they broke off the discussion. During a mid-February
1995 trip to Jakarta, I found the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
be immovable. Ambassador Ibrahim, the MFA director of political affairs,
and Ambassador Sutresma, who was in charge of NAM relations, listened
politely as I argued that a permanent NPT would be best for world stability,
arms control progress, and technical cooperation, but they said essentially
that if the United States would not compromise, it would be a difficult con-
ference. A day or so previously, Ambassador Ibrahim had said at a hearing
before the Indonesian House of Representatives that the reason Indonesia
was reluctant to support indefinite NPT extension was the absence of a com-
pulsory NPT deadline requiring the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their
stockpiles. I was carrying a letter from President Clinton to President
Suharto on NPT extension which also said that the United States would look
“positively” on a Southeast Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone—long desired
by Indonesia—if longstanding U.S. criteria for such zones were met. The let-
ter was to be delivered personally by me to President Suharto, but I was denied
admittance. The Chief of Indonesia’s nuclear agency (BATAN), Dr. Djali
Ahimsa, along with his staff, with whom I had a lengthy session in his office
in Djakarta, favored indefinite extension—being concerned about nuclear
trade—but had little influence on the MFA. My meeting with Ambassadors
Ibrahim and Sutresma was reported in the February 17, 1995, Jakarta Post
and I was accurately quoted as saying, “I wouldn’t say that there had been
great progress, I didn’t expect that when I came here.”

At the very end of the conference Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas,
observing the overwhelming support for indefinite extension, came to New
York and made a proposal that cleared the way for agreement on indefinite
NPT extension without a vote or, in effect, by consensus. This proposal was
to link the agreed Statement of Principles and Objectives on Non-prolifer-
ation and Disarmament with the agreed Statement on an Enhanced Treaty
Review, so that it was clear that the strengthened review process would con-
sider observance by the states parties of the NPT Principles and Objectives.
I wavered for a time because I was unsure how OSD would view this, but I
had to decide on the spot. The Indonesian ambassador to the IAEA came up
to me and said, “Oh come on, Tom, give us a crumb.” I finally decided to
take the chance. Unanimity was important, and no one ever complained.
Upon acceptance of this, Ambassador Dhanapala’s formulation on indefinite
extension was agreed by consensus.

COLOMBIA

Colombia, after long deliberation, agreed to support indefinite extension. I
visited Bogota in January 1995 for NPT extension consultations, arguing that
a permanent NPT would be the best possible basis for further progress in arms control, that the nuclear weapon states doing the nuclear disarmament needed the security of an NPT extended indefinitely. The foreign minister and the vice foreign minister spoke positively about the benefits of indefinite extension and also of the need for arms control progress, particularly a CTBT. However, the foreign minister said that Colombia had to keep in mind its traditional positions. Traveling around Bogota with U.S. Ambassador Frechette was an experience—a cavalcade of armored vans, and sixteen bodyguards armed with automatic weapons.

An exchange of letters took place between President Clinton and President Samper in February 1995. When I had visited Bogota in January 1995, Colombia was on the fence. The president’s letter coming the next month appeared to turn the tide and gradually Colombia, the next NAM chairman, came around to support indefinite extension.

MEXICO

Mexico also supported indefinite extension, but in its own proposal (containing certain conditions) that was separate from the Canadian-sponsored proposal for indefinite extension without conditions submitted by 105 parties (eventually 111) at the end of the third week of the conference. Ralph Earle and I met virtually daily at the conference with Mexican Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalez-Galvez, who attended Michigan State University for a year on a football scholarship and, after failing to make the team, spent his last three years at Georgetown University. These discussions were always constructive and they did help to move Mexico along the road to support of indefinite extension, but they did little to calm the anxiety in Washington. Mexico never sought support for, or co-sponsorship of, its proposal, but Mexico was the subject of many demarches during the extension process from President Clinton and Secretary Christopher on down. Indeed, its separate proposal was referred to in one of our intragovernmental discussions in the heated atmosphere of the final days of the conference as a “clear and present danger” to the national security of the United States. It was feared by some that supporters of the Canadian resolution might depart and support the Mexican resolution, which implied conditionality. Mexico did not seek this, nor was there any risk of it happening.

I had visited Mexico City in October 1993, and at that time was informed that Mexico would make its decision on NPT extension at the end of 1994. If the nuclear test moratorium was still holding among the four nuclear weapons states (U.S., U.K., France, and Russia) that were then observing a test moratorium and there was “significant progress” toward a CTBT, Mexico would support indefinite extension. In July 1994 the Mexican government assured Secretary of State Christopher that Mexico could support the
United States at the end. In January 1995 I visited Mexico and met with Vice Minister Rebolledo (Gonzalez-Galvez, the new deputy, was in Tokyo with Guerria, the new foreign minister) and asked that the new Mexican government reaffirm the position of the old. The response was equivocal. In February, Ted McNamara visited Mexico City carrying a letter from President Clinton to President Zedillo urging support for indefinite extension, but, like my experience in Djakarta, he was not permitted to deliver it personally. In McNamara’s discussions with Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalez-Galvez and Foreign Minister Guerria, he was asked by the Mexicans for special bilaterals with the United States on NPT extension prior to the conference. After several weeks, this was agreed.

Two special bilaterals were held between the United States and Mexico in the weeks before the conference. Prior to their commencement, in March 1995, I met with Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalez-Galvez on the margins of the OPANAL general conference, held every other year in Vina del Mar, Chile. In the first special bilateral, held in Washington, Gonzalez-Galvez, accompanied by Ambassador Marin-Bosch, had several meetings with John Holum, Ted McNamara, and myself, as well as with Lynn Davis and Strobe Talbott. The second bilateral was in New York on the eve of the conference. Gonzalez-Galvez met alone with Ralph, Lynn, and me. Little was accomplished at these meetings.

For twenty-five years, Mexico had been a thorn in the U.S. side at disarmament conferences. In part it was a result of the strong Mexican desire to eliminate nuclear weapons, and in part it was the result of the overall testy U.S.-Mexico relationship. Also, following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Mexico was determined that it never be caught up again in such a crisis. This had been the motivation for the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty. And from time to time Mexican diplomats would bring up the Mexican-American War and the loss of half of Mexico’s territory. I was never sure whether they were really still consumed by this or whether it was a ploy. Mexico’s rallying cry for a long time was to press for a CTBT against U.S. resistance. It was led for many years by Ambassador Garcia Robles, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. He was succeeded by his able lieutenant, Miguel Marin-Bosch, who also pressed the United States for years and single-handedly wrecked the 1990 NPT Review Conference over the CTBT issue.

Marin-Bosch was seen by many as our great antagonist, and was still Mexican CD ambassador in 1995. He was from Brooklyn, went to Yale and Columbia Law School, and carried a big chip on his shoulder about the United States. He was brilliant, witty, and charming. The newspapers somehow picked up the idea that he and I were mano a mano over NPT extension. The Washington Post ran a six-part series on the extension issue right before the conference and in the last part had our pictures on the front page with the headline: “A Hard Sell for Treaty Renewal.” The next day,
the opening day, I walked up to the Mexican delegation on the floor of the UN General Assembly and asked if they had seen the Post story. “Oh, we have all read it,” said Foreign Minister Guerria with a wink. Miguel suggested that he and I stage a fistfight on the floor for the benefit of the press. Marin-Bosch and the Mexican government were not, nor did they intend to be, a serious threat to indefinite extension by the time of the conference.

LATIN AMERICA

An Argentine delegation came to Washington for arms control bilaterals in the fall of 1993 and I hosted them as ACDA acting director. The delegation leader, a senior official from the Ministry of Defense, said in an emotional speech at dinner that Argentina had kept open the nuclear option, thinking it would add to their security, but it only served to cut them off from the countries with which they wished to be associated. So with the fall of the military dictatorship, they were free to end their nuclear program and join the NPT. Undersecretary Pfirter, later ambassador to the United Kingdom, and Assistant Secretary Enrique de la Torre were key figures in overcoming the military influence on this policy. In April 1994 I attended a conference in Bariloche, Argentina, on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At this conference Argentina made it clear it would join the NPT before the Review and Extension Conference, which it did in February of 1995, and support indefinite extension. I met with the Argentine ambassador to Washington in the summer of 1994 and he said in response to my inquiry as to whether Argentina remained committed to indefinite NPT extension, “We will be with you all the way.” Argentina was a real inspiration and I often said so in speeches. At Bariloche I made the luncheon speech the first day. I spoke on behalf of indefinite extension, but I also used the platform to indirectly castigate Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, for not joining the NPT.

A Peruvian representative in Bariloche made an eloquent speech announcing support for indefinite extension and Peru remained a stalwart supporter to the end of the extension process. Peru was the last country I visited immediately prior to the conference, on my way home from the OPAANAL meeting in Chile in March 1995. I wanted to thank them for their support. Bolivia had stated privately at the Bariloche conference that it would support indefinite extension, as did Ecuador when I visited there later in 1994. The members of caricom (the association of English-speaking Caribbean states) in New York, by means of a concluding statement by the chair (Grenada), indicated support for indefinite NPT extension at a meeting with me in June 1994 (nine of the thirteen members being present). Although there was debate, at the end of the discussion the chairman said, “Well, I guess we all support indefinite extension.” No one refuted him and all these
countries did support it. In January of 1995 at the United Nations, Honduras declared the support of the six Central American countries for indefinite extension.

An Opanal seminar in January 1995 (a joint Opanal/ACDA project) and the Opanal biennial general conference in Chile in March 1995 were important meetings for rallying support in Latin America, leading ultimately to unanimous support from Latin American NPT parties for indefinite extension (having in mind the special position of Mexico). The January seminar, held in Cancun, Mexico, was attended by thirty-three Latin American states, including Cuba, and important progress was made there. This seminar, which was funded by ACDA and organized by Opanal, was carefully worked out and proved to be a useful and constructive step along the way. Shortly before the Opanal general conference I also made a presentation in support of indefinite NPT extension to the Organization of American States in Washington, which was well attended by member states.

ACDA and Opanal (led by the most capable secretary general, Ambassador Roman-Moray, a distinguished career diplomat from Peru) worked closely together in 1994 and 1995. Ambassador Roman-Moray was a significant factor in the widespread support in Latin America for indefinite NPT extension. After the general conference in Chile, he was my host for the encouraging stop in Peru. Deborah Bozik, an ACDA expert on peaceful uses of nuclear technology, accompanied me to Chile and Peru (as well as Kenya and Ghana earlier). The 1995 Opanal general conference was attended by representatives of all the other nuclear weapon states, as well as Ambassador Höelich of Germany, who made a persuasive presentation in behalf of indefinite NPT extension. I made a speech there as did the ambassadors from the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China. At a bilateral discussion in Santiago shortly after the general conference, Chile indicated that it would join the NPT soon and that it favored indefinite extension. (Chile became an NPT party in late May 1995.) El Salvador, speaking at the conference on behalf of the six Central American states, reiterated their support for indefinite NPT extension. Argentina and Peru also made strong statements in support. Following up on Ralph Earle’s meeting with the Prime Minister of Belize (CARICOM chairman for 1995) in Washington the previous week, I met on the margins of the general conference with Ambassador Martinez, the representative for Belize (and also ambassador to Mexico and former national chairman of the prime minister’s party, who said that he spoke with the prime minister two or three times a week). He stated that there was no question that Belize would support indefinite NPT extension. We also had a useful discussion of Article IV (peaceful uses of nuclear energy) issues and he was surprised to learn that Belize could acquire nuclear medical equipment from the IAEA. This, combined with the previous meetings, suggested that CARICOM’s thirteen votes would be for indefinite extension. (Four or five CARICOM states had at this time declared for indefinite exten-
sion in bilateral exchanges with the United States—most notably and firmly the Bahamas.)

OTHER IMPORTANT NPT PARTIES

Ethiopia indicated privately in the spring of 1994 that it could support indefinite extension. Ghana also declared its support for indefinite extension during my January 1995 visit. While in Accra I spoke with the foreign minister and First Lady Nana Konadu, an important political figure—my visit with her produced rather broad press coverage. I stressed peaceful nuclear cooperation. Later in the year, she came to Brookhaven National Laboratory in Chicago to attend the signing of a U.S.-Ghana laboratory-to-laboratory exchange agreement. I visited Kenya after South Africa and paid a visit to the Jomo Kenyatta Hospital to view the IAEA-provided nuclear medical equipment. (Apparently I was one of only a few official visitors to visit the hospital, judging from the press interest—there was a front-page story with a picture in The Daily Nation on August 27 quoting me as saying, “We want a peaceful and cooperative world civilization and this includes the peaceful use of the atom.”) Kenya declared its support in 1994.

The UN ambassador from Senegal told me in 1994 that Senegal did and would continue to support indefinite extension as long as there was no official NAM position to the contrary (since they could never go against the NAM—that was the principal risk). Ivory Coast, Togo, and a number of others in conversations with U.S. diplomats or in diplomatic notes in 1994 and early 1995 stated that they would support indefinite extension.

In a dramatic presidential statement in early February 1995 the Philippines declared for indefinite NPT extension. When I arrived at Foreign Minister Romulo’s office in Manila later in the month, the minister said, “We have announced our position. What else can we do for the cause?” This was important, as the Philippines was the chair of the Group of 77 at the United Nations, the non-aligned organization. In my press conference in Manila on February 14, I expressed the gratitude of the United States for President Ramos’s decision to support indefinite extension. I was questioned about China by the press and replied that in the end China would probably support indefinite extension—as eventually it did.

Thus, by mid-February 1995 a majority appeared to be in hand for indefinite extension, and this number continued to rise to over 100 by the opening of the conference. In the April 9 article in the Washington Post mentioned earlier, the Post estimated that as of that date there were 79 NPT parties in favor of indefinite extension, 37 leaning toward it, 17 against, 23 leaning against, and 19 undecided. However, as support for indefinite extension grew, the goalposts moved somewhat. Article X.2 provided for
a decision to be taken by a majority of the parties to the treaty. Countries began to join the NPT more rapidly as the conference approached, and, thus, the 160 NPT parties in 1993 became 177 parties at the conference (187 today with the accession, for example, of Comoros, Oman, Vanuatu, and, at long last, Brazil in July of 1997), raising a simple majority from 81 to 89.

The small number of countries opposed to indefinite extension never really coalesced around a single position until the waning days of the conference. In May 1994, Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela advanced a proposal at a Programme for the Promotion of Nuclear Non-Proliferation meeting in Caracas that attracted some interest. It called for a twenty-five-year extension and then another extension conference with the same powers as the one provided for in Article X.2 for 1995. Under Article X.2, the 1995 conference delegates had the power on a one-time basis to bind their governments to an extension without reference to national parliaments—any further extension could only be by treaty amendment, a practical impossibility. Since the original treaty text ratified by national parliaments provided for only one extension conference, this power was delegated by parliaments in Article X.2 when they approved ratification of the NPT, but on a one-time-only basis. Thus, as a legal matter, there could be no second conference with the power to bind parties to an extension decision without amending the treaty. The Venezuelan proposal would have required an amendment. This was persuasively pointed out by the French representative, Thérèse Delpeche, at the meeting in Caracas. I also made a strong statement along these lines at the Caracas meeting and in a June 1994 speech to the American Bar Association. This argument was reiterated by the European Union in a legal opinion submitted to the third prepcom meeting, and by Mary Lib Hoinkes, now formally ACDA general counsel, in a July 1994 article in the Virginia Law Quarterly. Mary Lib engaged thereafter, at my urging, in a spirited six-month battle with Bill Epstein, formerly of the United Nations legal staff, in a series of contending articles in that publication. One of his articles bore the simple title “Hoinkes Is Wrong.” After these events there was a gradual loss of interest in the Venezuelan proposal.

The second prepcom in New York in January of 1994, chaired by the Eastern Group (Hungary), worked in a relatively constructive fashion. A number of prepcom procedural decisions, such as opening the meeting to non-party observers on the floor and NGO observers in the galleries, were agreed and Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala was approved as the conference presidential nominee. The third prepcom in Geneva in September 1994, chaired by the NAM (Nigeria), initially worked effectively—draft rules of procedure and the conference agenda were almost agreed—but it broke down on the last day amidst a disagreement between the NAM, the Western Group, and the Eastern Group over the chairmanship of the fourth prepcom and the allocation of conference leadership posts. This dispute was not resolved
until shortly before the fourth prepcom and for a time threatened both the orderly continuation of the extension process and the confirmation of Finland as the chair of the fourth prepcom.

Acting on behalf of the NAM, Indonesia submitted a document to the third prepcom that identified six areas in which “substantive progress” by the nuclear weapon states would “contribute to the successful outcome” of the conference. Mexican CD Ambassador Marin-Bosch played a prominent role in this effort, as he did during the entire NPT extension process. Briefly, these six objectives of the non-aligned states were:

1. agreement on a time-bound framework for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons;
2. adherence by the nuclear-weapon states to nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements, especially in the Middle East and Africa;
3. completion of a CTBT;
4. conclusion of a treaty providing legally binding positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT;
5. conclusion of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons that is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable, and universally applicable; and
6. guaranteeing free and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for developing non-nuclear weapon states.

The United States responded in February 1995, in a speech that I made before the annual meeting of the Arms Control Association with answers to each of the NAM objectives, demonstrating substantive progress in five of the six areas, while observing that the sixth was a non-issue. The real agenda for the sixth objective was nuclear assistance for Iran.

The first of the NAM objectives addressed the core obligations undertaken by the nuclear weapon states in Article VI to end the arms race and seek nuclear disarmament; I argued in my speech that it was perhaps here that the record of the nuclear weapon states was most demonstrably strong. In recent years the United States and the former Soviet Union had eliminated over 2,500 intermediate-range missiles and taken an entire class of weapons out of commission, decided unilaterally to withdraw and dismantle thousands more tactical arms, and in START I and START II, agreed to take more than 17,000 nuclear weapons off missiles and bombers. START I entered into force upon Ukraine’s accession to the NPT on December 5, 1994, Kazakhstan and Belarus having joined earlier.

Further, I argued that the NPT’s call for an end to the nuclear arms race had been met. Now, the race was on to bring nuclear force levels down as quickly and securely as possible. Since 1988, I said, the United States has reduced its total active stockpile by 59 percent; its strategic warheads by 47
percent; and its non-strategic nuclear force warheads by 90 percent. The United States is dismantling up to 2,000 nuclear weapons a year, the highest rate that technical limitations will permit, I said.

Second, I argued that the negotiation of an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (now the Treaty of Pelindaba) was nearing completion in January 1995. The United States had declared that it hoped to become a protocol party to this treaty and that it had the question of becoming a protocol party to the Treaty of Raratonga (South Pacific) under serious study. And, as noted above, in February 1995 President Clinton, in a letter to President Suharto of Indonesia, stated that the United States would look positively on the development of a Southeast Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone, assuming that long-standing U.S. criteria for such zones were met.

Third, the negotiation of a **CTBT** was actively being pursued in Geneva and considerable progress had already been made. The testing moratorium was being observed by four of the five nuclear weapon states.

Fourth, active negotiations on a new **UN** Security Council resolution updating positive and negative security assurances for **NPT** non-nuclear weapon states parties were well under way.

Fifth, in 1994 and early 1995, active efforts were underway to secure a mandate so as to commence the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off agreement in Geneva. A mandate to establish an ad hoc committee and commence negotiations was agreed in early 1995 (this later fell apart because of obstructionism by Pakistan).

Sixth, I argued that the reference in the **NAM** document to unimpeded access to nuclear technology was simply a front for Iran. No **NPT** party fully committed to its **NPT** obligations has ever been denied access to nuclear technology under safeguards. The reason that technology has been denied to Iran is because of concern over its commitment to its **NPT** obligations.

In order to make the Article IV case convincingly, **ACDA** and the Department of Energy compiled a database detailing instances of U.S.-supported technical cooperation with each **NPT** party. Having specific examples of past technical cooperation on hand, coupled with a ready willingness to discuss opportunities for future technical cooperation, allowed U.S. officials to quickly and effectively counter the argument, heard from many non-aligned states, that the United States is unresponsive to its Article IV technical cooperation commitments. Effective communication, backed by thorough preparation, turned discussion of U.S. compliance with Article IV from a potential negative into a strong positive in support of indefinite extension with many developing countries. Many countries thought Article IV assistance meant only power reactors, which a large number could not afford. They were unaware that it also meant assistance with things such as nuclear aid to agriculture and nuclear medical equipment. Ambassador Martinez of Belize in our discussion in Vina del Mar was surprised by this and said cancer patients in Belize had to go to Mexico for radiation treatment. I urged him to suggest
that the government of Belize seek IAEA help in acquiring nuclear medical technology.

The fourth prepcom in New York in January 1995, chaired again by the Western Group (Finland), was constructive throughout. Under Mary Lib’s leadership, the draft rules of procedure were agreed, except for the rule on voting, which was not agreed until immediately before the vote at the conference (some in the NAM were arguing for a secret ballot). The conference agenda, all conference leadership posts, and the financing formula for the conference were also agreed.

It should be noted that even then most parties believed that the United States would eventually back off indefinite extension and agree to something else. At a joint press conference with Egyptian United Nations Ambassador El Araby, sponsored by the Campaign for the NPT, I was asked about a proposal by George Bunn (the first ACDA general counsel from 1961 to 1969 and then a distinguished Stanford University professor and NPT expert) for automatic rolling twenty-five-year extensions. I replied that the United States did not support it, but rather supported indefinite extension. However, unlike the Taylhardat proposal, it was at least legally consistent with the Treaty. This was interpreted by a Reuters reporter unfamiliar with the issue as the United States falling off indefinite extension. The resulting inaccurate story was picked up by numerous papers, including the Boston Globe. The story was also reproduced and widely distributed to delegates and others at the conference by Greenpeace, even after I disavowed it publicly in a subsequent press conference called for this purpose in which I said that the United States had no intention of ever backing away from indefinite extension. Indeed, the story received front-page headlines in Al Ahram, Egypt’s influential newspaper. The United States could be outvoted, I said at the press conference, but would itself vote for no other option. Ambassador Ned Walker in Cairo had to personally reaffirm this to Foreign Minister Moussa as a result of the Al Ahram article.

The role of Ambassador Ayewah of Nigeria should also be mentioned. He had been chairman of the third prepcom and chaired Main Committee I (on disarmament) at the conference. Several times in 1994 he publicly stated that the NPT should be extended only for two or five years and expressed Nigerian interest in nuclear weapons. While somewhat more moderate in private bilaterals, he continued this public stance. On the margins of the fourth prepcom, at another meeting sponsored by the campaign for the NPT this time for African ambassadors, a spokesperson for Ambassador Ayewah sharing the podium with me stated that “the only reason that Nigeria does not have nuclear weapons is that we cannot afford them now” (with the “now” emphasized). This attitude helped the cause of indefinite NPT extension among West African states. Indeed, after the speeches at this meeting about ten African ambassadors in the audience rushed up to me and asked how they could
sign up right now for indefinite extension. In the chair of Main Committee I at the conference, Ambassador Ayewah seemed to regard the committee as a court to try the nuclear weapon states’ observance of the Article VI obligations and as a result he was ineffective.

In January 1995, on the margins of the prepcom, the United States had suggested the formation of a small group of states interested in actively supporting indefinite extension to manage preparations for the conference. There were three useful meetings of this group in February and March in Geneva (on the margins of the CD) and early April in New York. Discussions in this group led to the idea that supporters of indefinite extension should try to submit a proposal to the conference with a majority of parties supporting it, if possible. Canada was suggested as the coordinator and this was later endorsed by the Western and Eastern Groups in Geneva in March. Canada did submit this proposal with 105 co-sponsors at the end of the third week of the conference, demonstrating conclusively that indefinite extension had the legally required majority support.

Negotiations on a new UN Security Council resolution updating positive and negative security assurances for NPT non-nuclear weapon states parties, referred to in the list of NAM demands at the third prepcom, had been under way in Geneva among the nuclear weapon states parties throughout 1994. Originally I had been asked by Assistant Secretary of State for PM Bob Gal- lucci to do this, but Steve Ledogar took it over in Geneva and did a fine job. Positive security assurances were especially important to Egypt because of the Israeli issue. There were also P-5 negotiations held on the subject of security assurances on the margins of the second, third, and fourth prepcoms and, in June 1994, in Vienna. This was a priority objective for Egypt as well as other NAM parties.

Egypt made a strong demarche to me on the margins of the second prep- com on the subject of security assurances. Ambassador El Araby said that it was important that positive and negative security assurances be updated and expanded beyond the existing 1968/1978 versions (1968 was the signing of the NPT, and in 1978 assurances were given by the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom at the UN Special Session on Disarmament), and that they be made legally binding. Egypt was most interested in expanding the commitments of the positive assurances to increase the likelihood of international support should they ever be threatened by the Israeli nuclear program.

Most other NAM states were primarily interested in legally binding negative assurances as one of their quid pro quos for renouncing nuclear weapons. In 1994, twelve NAM states introduced a draft treaty on positive and negative security assurances in the CD. However, France—because of the importance of ambiguity in their nuclear doctrine—and Russia were strongly against explicitly making the negative assurances legally binding. Under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, par-
ties enjoy a legally binding negative security assurance from all five nuclear weapon states as a result of signature and ratification of Protocol II of the Treaty by all five. The same is now true for parties to the Treaty of Raratonga, the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, as well as parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba—the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty—since all five nuclear weapon states signed the protocols of the three treaties after the conference in order to fulfill one of their commitments in the Statement of Principles and Objectives to support existing and future nuclear-weapon-free zones. The United States unfortunately is the only nuclear weapon state that has not ratified the South Pacific and African Protocols.

Security assurance negotiations were completed in Geneva in March 1995 and the draft resolution was forwarded to New York. The Security Council adopted it unanimously in early April, but only after vigorous debate. It expanded somewhat on the 1968 positive security assurances, and France and China were added to the three who made the assurances in 1978. The negative security assurances in the resolution followed those made by the three in 1978 (using the U.K. version, which, as explained below, has a narrower exception), adding France and associating China, albeit with a statement of its own based on its “no first-use policy.” Neither the positive nor the negative security assurances were made legally binding and the negative assurances were outside the body of the resolution in the form of national statements. Several of the NAM parties, most notably Egypt and Indonesia, expressed considerable disappointment concerning the form of the assurances. Even though not legally binding—arguably—this commitment was very important to non-nuclear weapon states. After all, if they were permanently to forswear nuclear weapons, the least the nuclear weapon states could do was to promise never to use nuclear weapons against them. There was no qualification to this commitment (such as for an attack with chemical or biological weapons), with the one exception of an attack by a non-nuclear weapon state party in alliance with a nuclear weapon state (that is, the attack itself is made in alliance with a nuclear-weapon state—a narrow exception indeed), a holdover from Cold War days. These assurances were made most solemnly in association with a resolution of the Security Council and indefinite NPT extension depended upon them. The next year, 1996, the World Court indicated that these assurances should be considered legally binding as was already the case with respect to the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. The French and the British have always regarded these commitments to be of special seriousness because of their form and the circumstances under which they were given.

Another important part of NPT extension diplomacy was persuading Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which had nuclear weapons left on their territories by the former Soviet Union, to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and to support indefinite extension. Belarus joined the NPT in 1993 and its UN ambassador informed me in New York in June 1994 that Belarus
would support indefinite extension; Kazakhstan joined the NPT in early 1994 and its Washington ambassador came to my office and informed me that his country would support indefinite extension in August 1994. In doing so, he mentioned that some 500,000 people in his country were suffering from radiation-related sicknesses as a result of the Soviet tests at Semipalatinsk. This focused all attention on Ukraine. As explained in chapter 6, I appeared before the Rada in October 1994 advocating NPT membership. The Ukrainian Rada finally approved the NPT in October 1994, having ratified START I in March, which opened the door for START I entry into force at the OSCE summit conference in December 1994. At the 1995 NPT conference, Ukraine was a firm supporter of indefinite NPT extension. Very important to persuading Ukraine to join the NPT was the negotiation and ultimate agreement by four of the five nuclear weapon states (absent China) to provide Ukraine country-specific negative security assurances. What was ultimately agreed to was the language of the 1978 U.K. declaration, which—as I indicated—had a narrower exception than the 1978 U.S. declaration and was the basis for the 1995 NPT assurances in that the actual participation of the nuclear weapon state in the attack creating the exception was required—not just a paper alliance. The assurance language was made Ukraine-specific and updated to include France, with the Helsinki Final Act language about borders being changed only by peaceful means added. The security assurance signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France was not made legally binding, although, as I said, in its 1996 decision on nuclear weapons, the World Court strongly implied that all these commitments are legally binding.

Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala proved to be the best possible conference president. He was at the same time a committed non-aligned diplomat and dedicated to the strongest possible outcome for the NPT regime. On the margins of the second prepcom, in a bilateral meeting with Susan Burk and me, Jayantha expressed the view that rolling twenty-five-year periods, one succeeding the other automatically unless a majority of the parties voted “no,” would be the best possible outcome. This was his preferred position throughout most of the process. In June of 1994, in a bilateral in Washington, I informed him that the United States had no intention of ever supporting an extension option other than indefinite. It was pointed out that the United States would be directly affected by proliferation should it occur anywhere in the world and as a result this was too important for United States’ security to support a second-best option. The United States recognized that the decision was to be by majority vote and that it might be outvoted, but the United States would not support another option.

As the support for indefinite extension grew in the run-up to the conference, Ambassador Dhanapala changed his position. All along he had said that he wanted to see a consensus or near consensus result. Many in the NAM...
argued for this as a way of blocking indefinite extension. This contrasted with the stated United States and Western Group view that the treaty calls for a majority decision (because consensus could not be achieved in 1968), and a small majority for indefinite extension would be sufficient. But Jayantha believed a consensus outcome was important for the future health of the NPT regime. By the time of the conference, he had apparently concluded that perhaps he, as president, could find that there was a consensus that a majority favored indefinite extension and thus could gavel through indefinite extension without a vote on a no objection basis—a “parliamentary consensus,” in his words. Thereafter, throughout the conference, his efforts were largely in this direction. Ralph Earle and I had many bilaterals with Ambassador Dhanapala during the conference to work toward this result.

In his 1995 State of the Union Address, which took place during the fourth prepcom meeting, President Clinton pledged that the United States would “lead the charge” for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Further, declaring 1995 a year of decision for arms control and non-proliferation, National Security Advisor Tony Lake had announced in a speech on January 31 that the United States would withdraw its proposed ten-year withdrawal clause from its CTBT proposal. This was an important step not only for the effort to conclude a CTBT, but also for the effort to achieve indefinite NPT extension, because it committed the United States to a permanent CTBT while it was arguing for a permanent NPT. NAM members had frequently attacked the inconsistency between a permanent NPT and a CTBT that could disappear (because of the ten-year clause).

On March 1, President Clinton reiterated his personal support for a permanent NPT, saying “nothing is more important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons than extending the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally.” He reaffirmed the commitment of the U.S. government to the central goals of the treaty: non-proliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and the pursuit of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The president went further in a speech celebrating the 25th anniversary of the entry-into-force of the NPT. He reemphasized the importance of nuclear disarmament negotiations and made an additional U.S. commitment to the goals of the treaty by ordering 200 tons of fissile material—enough for thousands of nuclear weapons—to be permanently withdrawn from the U.S. nuclear stockpile. None of that material will be used to build a nuclear weapon ever again. The president decided that this bold disarmament gesture was an appropriate way to emphasize the commitment of the United States both to Article VI and to the NPT in general.

On the eve of the conference, the United States remained committed to building the largest possible majority in support of indefinite extension, but many officials in the U.S. government and other governments as well as most NGOs were not overly optimistic about the prospects for consensus. The pub-
lic position of the United States regarding the predicted outcome was that the “only vote that counts is the one in May, but if the vote were held today, we believe a majority of the parties support indefinite extension.” However, efforts were underway to increase support.

As stated, the conference opened without agreement on the procedure by which the vote (or votes, if the first failed to establish a majority) on extension options would be taken. With the decision procedures undecided, the effort to gather a majority of co-sponsors for a proposal for indefinite extension under Canadian leadership took on added importance. This effort was conducted in a low-key way so that questions about whether or not a majority had been achieved would be minimized. The objective was to try to accumulate the largest possible number of co-sponsors, a majority if possible, before submission. As stated, Canada was designated as the coordinator and as such was given custodianship of the original list, and representatives of other countries sought signatures on duplicate copies. Canadian Disarmament Ambassador Chris Wesdahl, the successor to Ambassador Peggy Mason, who was most effective in supporting indefinite extension in 1993 and 1994, did a superb job in leading the resolution effort. Many of us will long remember his introduction of the Canadian resolution for indefinite extension on the floor of the General Assembly in the third week of the conference, in which he solemnly intoned the names of the 105 co-sponsors. The die was indeed cast at that point.

Vice President Gore, in making the opening U.S. national statement at the conference, as U.S. delegation head, reaffirmed (consistent with the joint communiqué signed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Rao of India in 1994, which, as I said, I had hawked around the world) that complete nuclear disarmament remains the ultimate goal of the United States:

> [T]he treaty did not create a permanent class of nuclear weapon states. What the treaty did create was a requirement that those who already possessed nuclear weapons did not help others to acquire them, coupled with a binding legal obligation in Article VI to pursue good faith negotiations on nuclear arms control and disarmament. By extending the NPT indefinitely, non-nuclear weapons states will ensure that this obligation remains permanently binding and create the conditions for its ultimate achievement.

The vice president also made clear the U.S. commitment to achieve a CTBT at the earliest possible date. Vice President Gore’s speech, coming early in the conference, provided a major boost to efforts to achieve indefinite extension.

South African Foreign Minister Nzo played an indispensable role in bridging the gap between the developed and the developing world by providing the basis for the development of principles and objectives on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and for beneficial enhancements to the NPT.
review process. After Nzo’s speech, in bilateral consultations with the foreign minister, and with the senior leadership of the two NPT conference delegations also present, Vice President Gore seized the opportunity presented by the South African proposal and committed the United States’ delegation to work very closely with South Africa. He stated very firmly to both delegations, “I want all of you to work closely together,” and he left no doubt who would be in charge. For, in taking its decision to support indefinite extension, the new government of South Africa demonstrated its ability to think beyond Cold War categories. It recognized that the treaty was too important to South Africa to be placed in jeopardy. This decision was a courageous one because the government faced criticism from within the NAM for being too closely linked with Europe and the United States. South Africa’s unique status as a former nuclear weapon state, a developing nation that is a member of the NAM and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and President Mandela’s own great personal moral authority made the country a central player in brokering indefinite extension. Through able diplomacy, Foreign Minister Nzo helped to deliver the long-sought “significant majority” into the camp of supporters of indefinite extension without conditions.

In the past, NAM decisions were often made by a vocal few riding roughshod over a silent majority. Accepting the mantle of this type of “leadership” usually fell to states who took radical positions in opposition to one or both of the superpowers during the Cold War, attempting to maximize the developing world’s leverage in the global zero-sum competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although this process had become an anachronism with the end of the Cold War, it was observable during the NPT prepcoms and the conference itself as some states tried to maintain their leadership role based on reflexive antagonism directed toward the nuclear weapon states and the West in general, and the United States in particular. In contrast to UN practice, meetings were often called early in the morning and dominated by well-rested and prepared members of larger delegations from states with an animus against the developed world (such as Malaysia, Nigeria, and Indonesia). They sought to promote narrow national interests unrelated and often at odds with the broader interests of the developing world. Indeed, one day during the fourth prepcom I was seated right behind the ambassador of Venezuela. The NAM had just made an ill-advised proposal clearly contrary to the national interests of Venezuela among others. I tapped the ambassador on the shoulder and asked, “How can you support that as a member of NAM? It is contrary to your interests.” He replied, “But you have to understand NAM. The meetings are called at 9:00 A.M. and of the 110 delegations only about fifteen are present. Only one or two speak, there is no dissent and silence is taken as consent. Thus, all are bound.” It did not seem very democratic to me. A large number of non-aligned countries were represented at the conference only by their UN permanent representatives, who had less time and resources to devote to the NPT process than larger
delegations from capitals. These meetings often produced “consensus” positions, from which member states were quick to disassociate themselves in bilateral consultations with the United States. Much of the success of the NPT extension is owed to the United States’ strategy of sidestepping the NAM “leadership” and appealing to individual non-aligned states in capitals on the basis of their own security interests.

During the week of April 24, the second week of the conference, the foreign ministers of NAM states met in Bandung, Indonesia, the site of the movement’s founding, to observe its 40th anniversary. Many ambassadors left the conference in New York for several days to attend this meeting. When the Indonesian chairman of the Bandung meeting called for consensus support from the NAM for a proposal for a limited NPT extension, Ambassador Mongbe, the permanent representative of Benin in New York, stood up and objected. He clearly stated his country’s support for indefinite extension. This was followed by a number of others, including South Africa, and thus no position on NPT extension was agreed to at Bandung. Ambassador Mongbe was referred to afterwards at the NPT conference as the “hero of Bandung.” It took courage to do what he did.

During the May 5 plenary at the conference, Canadian Ambassador Wessdahl presented the proposal for indefinite extension without conditions co-sponsored by 105 states parties to the NPT, easily a majority. This number quickly grew to 111. (This co-sponsorship list did not include South Africa or a number of states closely aligned with it. With their support the number of NPT parties supporting indefinite extension exceeded 150.)

After the Bandung meeting, Indonesia introduced (also on May 5) a proposal of its own calling for a rolling twenty-five-year extension, which was sponsored by eleven countries. However, in the final week of the conference, as I said above, Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas proposed a linkage between the emerging Statement of Principles and Objectives on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and the Statement on an Enhanced Review Process, thus making possible consensus agreement on the conference president’s three-part package of indefinite extension, non-proliferation principles and objectives, and an enhanced review process. These documents had been developed as such in a twenty-five-state President’s Committee. The Committee had been established and was chaired by Ambassador Dhanapala. It was inspired by the South African proposal to establish principles to measure disarmament progress related to the NPT and a strengthened review process. Thus, Foreign Minister Nzo’s speech was arguably the most important of the conference. The proposal of Foreign Minister Alatas made near the end of the conference was accepted and became part of the package.

This final settlement (not anticipating the last-minute Indonesian addition) was foreshadowed and essentially worked out at a dinner for about a dozen representatives on May 8 hosted by Australian Ambassador Richard Butler (later head of the UN Special Commission on Iraq) and attended by,
among others, Ambassador Dhanapala, myself, U.K. Ambassador Weston, Ambassador of France Ererra, Russian delegation head Kisliak, German Ambassador Hoffmann, Chinese Ambassador Sha Zukang, South African delegation head Minty, and Indonesian Ambassador Wisnumurti. (Mexican Deputy Foreign Minister González Galvés was invited, but had to decline at the last minute because of an urgent call from Mexico City.) As Ambassador Dhanapala later observed, “This resulted in three parallel decisions being presented to the conference with built-in linkages, although it was acknowledged that while the extension decision was legally binding the two other decisions were politically binding.” This development brought consensus on the president’s package of decisions within the grasp of the conference.

At the plenary scheduled for 10:00 A.M. on May 11, the president put forward his package of decisions for consideration. The package included the extension decision itself, the Statement of Principles and Objectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and the strengthened review process decision. The president’s intent was for the three decisions to be adopted together without a vote, followed by the adoption of the depositaries resolution on the Middle East. However, a late objection by Iran to the text of the Middle East resolution precipitated two hours of fevered negotiations. The plenary resumed at noon with the positive references to the Middle East peace process in the depositaries resolution sufficiently watered down to be acceptable to Iran. First the president’s package (with a healthy fast gavel), followed by the Middle East resolution, were adopted without a vote. After the decisions were taken, eleven countries spoke in favor of indefinite extension, while eleven others voiced opposition (all having a firm grasp of the boundaries that their dissatisfaction should not cross).

A conference final document could not be achieved in the final day and a half, largely because of disagreements in Main Committee I (chaired by Nigeria), which were too great for first the Drafting Committee (chaired by Poland), and then the President’s Committee on May 11 and 12, to bridge. This result was quite disappointing to President Dhanapala, and many in the NAM blamed this outcome largely on the unwillingness of the United Kingdom and France to make any further concrete disarmament commitments.

However, support for increased peaceful cooperation and for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s “93 +2” Program to improve safeguards was expressed by the conference in the largely complete reports of Main Committee II (peaceful uses, chaired by Hungary) and Main Committee III (safeguards, chaired by the Netherlands), among broader areas of agreement.

The enhanced review process established the virtually annual prepcom meetings leading to the five-year review conferences and provides that disarmament progress is a valid subject of this process. The Indonesian proposal explicitly links the commitments of the Statement of Principles and Objectives to this enhanced review so progress in meeting those obligations
is to be an integral part of the review process. All of this is part of the indefinite extension package and it is important to understand that a failure to meet the obligations of the Statement of Principles and Objectives—especially reductions in nuclear weapons—will endanger the permanent status of the NPT or even the NPT regime itself. Several important NAM ambassadors made this point to me privately at the conclusion of the conference in emphasizing that the NPT created two classes of member states, and they were only willing to remain second-class states under the NPT temporarily as negotiated disarmament proceeded. They were not willing to be second-class states on a permanent basis.

The agreed Statement of Principles and Objectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament inspired by South Africa and adopted by the President’s Committee committed the nuclear weapon states, and indeed all NPT parties, to nuclear disarmament progress in support of the NPT. In general, the statement called for, among other things, a CTBT in 1996 (explicitly approved by the five nuclear weapon states in the President’s Committee); continued commitment to negotiated reductions in nuclear weapons (a most important obligation); NPT universality of membership (read Israel, but much progress was made after the conference, so that by 1998 there were only four states outside the NPT—India, Pakistan, Israel, and Cuba); support of existing and future nuclear-weapon-free zones particularly in the Middle East and Africa (the Raratonga and Pelindaba Treaties are important here); and improved NPT verification (the 93 + 2 Protocol adopted by the IAEA in June of 1997 is an important advance as it adds a number of verification improvements, such as environmental sampling, and it needs to be widely ratified).

One of the most important characteristics of the indefinite extension of the NPT is that it was a collaborative and inclusive success. It was a victory of all the states parties to the NPT, not against each other, but against a common problem threatening their survival and prosperity: the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The extension decision that was taken was a much stronger one for the health of the treaty regime than many had even hoped for on the eve of the conference. It was taken without a vote, or by consensus as the term is used in parliamentary procedure. The NPT will continue in force indefinitely and without conditions. Review conferences will continue to be held every five years, with the first prepcom meeting held in 1997, three years before the review conference. Unfortunately, largely because of nuclear weapon state intransigence, the 1997 and 1998 prepcoms ended in disarray, with the 1998 prepcom, because of U.S. resistance, unable even to reaffirm the text of the 1995 depositaries’ Resolution on the Middle East. Oman, the Arab Emirates, and Djibouti had since joined the NPT, so a call for all states in the Middle East region to join could only mean Israel. The 1999 prepcom result was marginally better. The prepcoms after 1995 were charged with addressing substantive as well as procedural and organizational issues. The review process will use the Statement of Principles and Object-
vatives to evaluate and guide future progress, but the agreement to extend the NPT indefinitely and to have an enhanced review process will not be limited to measures in the principles and objectives document.

The 2000 Review Conference—in the wake of the rejection of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate in 1999, nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in 1998, continuing pressure on the ABM Treaty by the U.S. NMD program, continued adherence to first-use options by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Russia (as well as NATO), and a lack of negotiated disarmament progress—nevertheless reached a quite positive result, indicating the continued commitment of most of the world community to the principles of the NPT. This was due to the important contribution of the New Agenda Coalition, seven states (Mexico, South Africa, Brazil, Ireland, Sweden, New Zealand, and Egypt) which have banded together to press for disarmament progress, and gives the world community an important respite, but only a respite which should be understood as such, in the effort to save the NPT for the long term. The 2000 Review Conference, among other things, agreed to the preservation of the ABM Treaty, a nuclear test moratorium until the CTBT enters into force—making these NPT-related commitments—a fissile material cutoff treaty by 2005, a report on security assurances for the 2005 Review Conference, and an “unequivocal undertaking” by the nuclear weapon states to proceed to nuclear disarmament.

In sum, the 1995 NPT conference agreement to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions amounted to the achievement of one of the United States’ highest foreign policy objectives. The president had the support of the Congress for indefinite NPT extension throughout the process. In February 1995, after the above-mentioned hearing on the forthcoming conference, Chairman Roth and Senator Glenn (the ranking Democratic member) of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs co-sponsored a strong resolution supporting indefinite NPT extension. It passed the Senate unanimously. After the conference result, I received a congratulatory telephone message from Senator Nancy Kassebaum, among others. Senator Roth made a floor statement on May 11 in which he kindly mentioned me along with Ambassador Dhanapala and set the right tone in saying, “We have achieved a critical victory in making the post–Cold War period safer and more secure. This is a victory for all the world’s people.” It was also important that the U.S. NGO community was active in support of indefinite NPT extension.

This achievement is representative of the kind of foreign policy victory the United States should favor: collaborative success. In a press briefing in Washington on May 16 with John Holum, I said, “The United States recognizes that in effect, through this enhanced review process and statement of principles, it . . . and other nuclear weapon states—have given an IOU to the rest of the world for the future.” As Conference President Dhanapala, who demonstrated at this conference that he is a leading world statesman, noted in his closing conference remarks, the success of the NPT Review and
Extension Conference rests on “enlarging areas of agreement.” (Ambassador Dhanapala is now UN undersecretary-general for disarmament.) The objective of the United States was to move this debate away from narrow bloc politics by engaging individual states in the spirit of sovereign equality, and appealing to them to address their own security concerns themselves rather than follow bloc leadership. In doing so, we collaborated with our partners around the world to reveal and pursue a common interest, which is something we will be called upon to do many times in the post–Cold War world.